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Reconciling Joint Tenancies withWrits
of Seizure and Sale
Alvin W-L See*
Co-ownership; Joint tenancies; Judgment debtors; Power of sale; Powers of
seizure; Severance; Singapore; Writs
Abstract
This article examines the use of the writ of seizure and sale as a method of execution
against a joint tenant’s interest in land and how it is to be reconciled with
established principles of co-ownership law, in particular the fundamental distinction
between a joint tenancy and a tenancy in common.
Introduction
In many common law countries, one of the primary methods of enforcing a money
judgment is by way of a writ of seizure and sale (WSS).1 Originally applicable
only to chattels, theWSS has since been adapted for use against land. In Singapore,
following the abolishment of the charging order in 1991, the WSS has been the
principal mode of execution against an interest in land. However, whether a WSS
can be used against one joint tenant has been uncertain. The crux of the
disagreement is whether a joint tenant owns a distinct interest in the land that can
be seized and sold. At present, the question has been directly addressed in six High
Court decisions: two answering in the negative2 and four in the affirmative.3 This
uncertainty gave rise to concerns among judgment creditors especially as the
majority of residential property in Singapore are jointly held for social and
economic reasons.4
Although the disagreement has spanned more than two decades, with two of
the six cases eventually going up to the Singapore Court of Appeal, the apex court
has yet to be presented with the opportunity to directly address the matter. In one
case, the appealing judgment creditor did not challenge the lower court’s holding
that a joint tenant has no distinct interest that can be seized and sold but instead
focused on arguing that a severance has occurred prior to the registration of his
WSS.5 The other case concerned a competition between two judgment creditors
*Associate Professor of Law, Singapore Management University.
1The WSS has its origin in the writ of fieri facias.
2Malayan Banking Bhd v Focal Finance Ltd [1998] S.G.H.C. 402; [1998] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 1008; Chan Lung Kien v
Chan Shwe Ching [2017] S.G.H.C. 136; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 208.
3Chan Shwe Ching v Leong Lai Yee [2015] S.G.H.C. 210; [2015] 5 S.L.R. 295; Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial
Patrick [2018] S.G.H.C. 59; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 1003; Ong Boon Hwee v Cheah Ng Soo [2019] S.G.H.C. 65; [2019] 4
S.L.R. 1392; Chain Land Elevator Corp v FB Industries Pte Ltd [2020] S.G.H.C. 2; [2020] 5 S.L.R. 1336.
4 Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2007] S.G.C.A. 54; [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 108 at [1].
5Chan Lung Kien v Chan Shwe Ching [2018] S.G.C.A. 24; [2018] 2 S.L.R. 84, noted in A. W. L. See, “Severance
by Unilateral Declaration: Lessons from Singapore” [2019] Conv. 138. The respondent (also a judgment creditor),
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over the surplus sale proceeds after the land was sold by an existing mortgagee.6
Unsurprisingly, neither of them challenged the lower court’s holding that a WSS
can be used against a joint tenant.7 The Court of Appeal’s refusal to make any
pronouncement on the matter without the benefit of submissions on both views,
whilst perfectly understandable, illustrates the role of luck in the development of
the common law.
The issue at hand presents itself at the intersection between procedural and
substantive laws. Beyond its practical importance in civil litigation, the issue also
provides us with an opportunity to revisit certain fundamental concepts of
co-ownership law, which will be of interest to land lawyers. In particular, the issue
is closely related to the question whether, in the process of execution, the joint
tenancy is severed at some point and if so when and on what basis. Although the
more recent decisions have identified almost every conceivable reason why the
use of a WSS against one joint tenant should be allowed—focusing on legislative
intent, consistency with other Commonwealth jurisdictions, question of fairness,
and other practical considerations—the courts have been unable to reconcile the
desired outcome with the basic principle that joint tenants own everything together
but nothing on their own, which in turn implies that each joint tenant has no distinct
interest that can be seized and sold. The increasingly popular view that each joint
tenant has a distinct, albeit notional, interest that can be seized and sold has the
unfortunate effect of unsettling the fundamental distinction between a joint tenancy
and a tenancy in common. Taking the view that the distinction ought to be
preserved, this article offers an alternative explanation which locates the issue
within a recognised mode of severance. In short, the joint tenancy is severed when
the Sheriff exercises a statutory power to alienate the interest of the judgment
debtor, which is conceptually identical to alienation by the joint tenant him or
herself.
The requirement of a distinct interest and the imaginary aliquot
share
The debate centres around a literal reading of the Land Titles Act s.135(1), which
states that the Sheriff may only sell “the interest which belongs to the judgment
debtor at the date of the registration of the writ”.8 Where the execution debtor is
a co-owner of land, precisely what belongs to him or her will depend on the type
of co-ownership in question. The issue is straightforward insofar as a tenancy in
common is concerned. As each tenant in common has an undivided share, the
Sheriff can sell the judgment debtor’s share without affecting the share of the other
tenant in common.
However, if the judgment debtor is a joint tenant, a difficult question arises as
to what he or she actually owns given the settled principle that “each joint tenant
holds the whole jointly and nothing severally”.9As LathamCJ explained inWright
v Gibbons:
whose WSS was registered prior to the alleged severance, had the greater incentive to challenge the lower court’s
decision. However, the respondent did not participate in the appeal proceedings.
6 Singapore Air Charter Pte Ltd v Peter Low & Choo LLC [2020] S.G.C.A. 99; [2020] 2 S.L.R. 1399.
7The joint tenants, who could have challenged that holding, did not do so.
8Land Titles Act Cap.157, 2004 Rev. Ed.
9Goh Teh Lee v Lim Li Pheng Maria [2010] S.G.C.A. 18; [2010] 3 S.L.R. 364 at [11].
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“The interests of each joint tenant in the land held are always the same in
respect of possession, interest, title and time. No distinction can be drawn
between the interest of any one tenant and that of any other tenant.”10
One way of approaching this issue is by reasoning backwards. In Malayan
Banking Bhd v Focal Finance Ltd, Tay JC (as he then was) explained that if the
jointly held interest (i.e. the entire estate) is allowed to be taken in execution, the
Sheriff would be selling not only what belongs to the judgment debtor but also
what belongs to the other joint tenant(s).11 Such an outcome would contradict the
wording of s.135(1). From this, the learned judge inferred that any interest to be
taken in execution “must be distinct and identifiable and cannot be a joint interest
held with someone not subject to the judgment and the execution”.12 In that case,
the WSS was held to be invalid in the absence of severance of the joint tenancy.13
The decision in Malayan Banking was swiftly met with criticism by Professor
Tan, who argued that even in the absence of severance, a joint tenant has a distinct
interest that can be seized and sold.14 As she explained:
“[S]everance into undivided shares is not a prerequisite for the issuance of a
writ of seizure and sale against a joint tenant’s interest. He has an interest,
which can be converted into an undivided share by alienation, and ‘for the
purposes of alienation each is conceived as entitled to dispose of an aliquot
share’.”15
The second half of this statement was derived from the seminal judgment of
Dixon J inWright v Gibbons, which referred to the “two not altogether compatible
aspects of joint tenancy”.16 The general principle is that joint tenants own nothing
on their own but everything together. Between them there is unity of interest,
which means that joint tenants hold onto the very same estate. However, this
general principle is subject to the qualification that a joint tenant has the power to
dispose of an aliquot share. As Dixon J explained, “[f]or purposes of alienation
each is conceived as entitled to dispose of an aliquot share”.17 Indeed, alienation,
being an act of operating upon one’s own share, has traditionally been recognised
as a principal mode of unilateral severance.18
Arguably the best way of explaining this qualification is to regard it as a fiction
that is necessary to address the logical difficulty of allowing a joint tenant to
alienate what he or she does not actually have.19 If the proper sequence of events
were to be insisted, the joint tenancy would have to be severed first, and only then
10Wright v Gibbons [1949] H.C.A. 3; (1949) 78 C.L.R. 313 at 323.
11Malayan Banking Bhd v Focal Finance Ltd [1998] S.G.H.C. 402; [1998] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 1008 at 15.
12Malayan Banking Bhd v Focal Finance Ltd [1998] S.G.H.C. 402; [1998] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 1008 at 15.
13 See Severance upon the registration of the WSS below.
14 S. Y. Tan, “Execution Against Co-Owned Property” [2000] S.J.L.S. 52.
15 S. Y. Tan, “Execution Against Co-Owned Property” [2000] S.J.L.S. 52, 57. See also H. W. Tang and K. F. K.
Low, Tan Sook Yee’s Principles of Singapore Land Law, 4th edn (Singapore: LexisNexis, 2019), pp.212–213.
16Wright v Gibbons [1949] H.C.A. 3; (1949) 78 C.L.R. 313 at 330.
17Wright v Gibbons [1949] H.C.A. 3; (1949) 78 C.L.R. 313 at 330.
18Williams v Hensman (1861) 1 John & H. 547. This mode of severance has been recognised by the Singapore
Court of Appeal in many occasions: Jack Chia-MPH Ltd v Malayan Credit Ltd [1984] S.G.C.A. 8; [1983–1984]
S.L.R.(R.) 420; Sivakolunthu Kumarasamy v Shanmugam Nagaiah [1987] S.G.C.A. 21; [1987] S.L.R.(R.) 702;Diaz
Priscillia v Diaz Angela [1997] S.G.C.A. 55; [1997] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 759 at 27; Chan Lung Kien v Chan Shwe Ching
[2018] S.G.C.A. 24; [2018] 2 S.L.R. 84 at [19].
19As Professor Crown observed, “[t]he truth of the matter is that modern lawyers accept the idea of severance by
alienation not because it makes any logical sense, but simply because it is enshrined in the case law”: B. C. Crown,
“Severance of joint tenancy of land by partial alienation” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 477, 488.
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the severing joint tenant (now a tenant in common) would acquire an undivided
share which can be the subject of alienation. The role of the fiction is to gloss over
this logical difficulty. As Gray and Gray explained:
“The only way in which the alienor can validly dispose of an ‘interest’ is on
the assumption that severance has already occurred. The act of alienation is
thus, paradoxically, both the source and the vehicle of the interest conveyed.”20
The real problem arises when the fiction is taken too seriously and beyond its
original scope, i.e. where alienation is not an issue. In Ong Boon Hwee v Cheah
Ng Soo, Chan J agreed with Professor Tan that “the WSS may attach to a joint
tenant’s interest in land independent of severance”.21 This was building upon the
opinion of Pang JC in Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial Patrick that even in the
absence of severance a joint tenant has “a real and present interest … as opposed
to a future, contingent or speculative interest”.22 Emphasis was placed on “the
severability of the joint tenancy and the ability of a joint tenant to alienate his
aliquot share (or potential aliquot share) without the consent of the other joint
tenants”.23 Most recently, in Chain Land Elevator Corp v FB Industries Pte Ltd,
Tan J attempted the impossible task of distinguishing the positions pre and post
severance:
“[T]he law recognises [a joint tenant] as having a notional, aliquot share, i.e.
a share that is a potentially rather than actually divided share in property. A
joint tenant’s aliquot share is converted into actual, undivided shares in
property held as a tenant in common upon severance.”24
With respect, it is difficult to discern any conceptual difference between a
pre-severance aliquot share under a joint tenancy and a post-severance undivided
share under a tenancy in common. Although Tan J regarded the pre-severance
aliquot share as merely notional rather than actual, the distinction is clearly illusory
as the notional share is treated as having the same effect as a post-severance
undivided share. Both types of interests can be seized and sold.
The fundamental objection to recognising a pre-severance aliquot share is that
any notion of shareholding is conceptually at odds with the rule of survivorship,
the halmark of a joint tenancy. The error likely stems from the failure to distinguish
between an inchoate interest and an actual interest. As Gray and Gray observed:
“[E]very joint tenancy is also potentially a tenancy in common, and every
joint tenant is proleptically a co-owner in equal shares and thus entitled to
dispose of his aliquot share … There is sometimes an irresistible temptation
to refer to joint tenants as being already entitled to equal shares, but this
merely reflects the extremely marginal nature of the legal distinction between
the actual and the inchoate rights of the joint tenant.”25
20K. Gray and S. F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p.946. See also B. C. Crown,
“Severance of joint tenancy of land by partial alienation” (2001) 117 L.Q.R. 477, 478.
21Ong Boon Hwee v Cheah Ng Soo [2019] S.G.H.C. 65; [2019] 4 S.L.R. 1392 at [50] (emphasis in original).
22Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial Patrick [2018] S.G.H.C. 59; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 1003 at [71].
23Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial Patrick [2018] S.G.H.C. 59; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 1003 at [88].
24Chain Land Elevator Corp v FB Industries Pte Ltd [2020] S.G.H.C. 2; [2020] 5 S.L.R. 1336 at [46].
25K. Gray and S. F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2008), p.915. See also S. Bridge, E.
Cooke and M. Dixon,Megarry & Wade: The Law of Read Property, 9th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2019),
p.495; B. Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law, 7th edn (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2017), p.240.
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An inchoate interest is, in reality, nothing at all. What the joint tenant has is a
power to sever jointly held interest into aliquot undivided shares, thereby converting
the joint tenancy into a tenancy in common.26 Importantly, merely because he or
she could exercise this power does not mean that he or she certainly would. In the
absence of any conduct indicating that the power has been exercised, there is
simply no good justification for invoking another fiction. If one accepts that the
fundamental distinction between a joint tenancy and a tenancy common should be
maintained, then it would be logical to focus instead on the issue of severance.
Severance upon the registration of the WSS
Interestingly, although Peter Low was instrumental in promulgating the fiction of
a pre-severance aliquot share, the decision ultimately rested on the finding of a
severance upon the registration of the WSS.27 This is consistent with Dixon J’s
obiter statement inWright v Gibbons: “Execution on a judgement for debt against
one joint tenant bound his aliquot share and continued to do so in the hands of the
survivor if the execution debtor afterwards died”.28 The only logical explanation
as to why the rule of survivorship does not apply to extinguish the execution
debtor’s interest is that the joint tenancy has been severed.
Although the focus on severance preserves the distinction between a joint tenancy
and a tenancy in common, this cannot in itself be the reason for finding a severance.
A separate justification has to be found. In Peter Low, the learned judge explained
that “severance of a joint tenancy occurs when the debtor-joint tenant’s interest is
seized and this seizure occurs when the WSS is registered”.29 With respect, this is
reading too much into what seizure entails. Under the Torrens system, seizure is
achieved notionally by a direction to the Registrar of Titles to refrain from
registering any instrument of dealing executed by the judgment debtor.30Certainly,
although this prohibition is specifically directed at the judgment debtor, the other
joint tenant(s) may also be affected. Thus, any attempt by both joint tenants to deal
with the entire interest in the land will be denied registration, as one of them is
forbidden from doing so. Notwithstanding this, it remains true that a WSS does
not involve the seizure of any specific interest of the judgment debtor.31 For this
reason, a notional seizure does not necessarily result in severance of the joint
tenancy.32
Having said this, the view in Peter Low finds support in a literal reading of the
Land Titles Act s.135(1), which allows the Sheriff to sell only “the interest which
belongs to the judgment debtor at the date of the registration of the writ”.33 This
26B. Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law, 7th edn (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2017), p.268.
27Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial Patrick [2018] S.G.H.C. 59; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 1003 at [97].
28Wright v Gibbons [1949] H.C.A. 3; (1949) 78 C.L.R. 313 at 330. See also Guthrie v ANZ Banking Group Ltd
(1991) 23 N.S.W.L.R. 672 at 680.
29Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial Patrick [2018] S.G.H.C. 59; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 1003 at [97].
30Land Titles Act s.133. Even under the common law, seizure in the context of land merely defines the priorities
between a person who has dealt with the Sheriff and a person who has dealt with the judgment debtor. See E. I. Sykes,
“The Effect of Judgments on Land in Australia” (1953) 27 A.L.J. 226 (Pt I).
31United Overseas Bank Ltd v Chia Kin Tuck [2006] S.G.H.C. 87; [2006] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 322 at [10];Hall v Richards
(1961) 108 C.L.R. 84. See also J. Baalman, The Singapore Torrens system: being a commentary on the Land Titles
Ordinance 1956 of the State of Singapore (Singapore: Government Printer, 1961), p.211; E. I. Sykes, “The Effect of
Judgments on Land in Australia” (1953) 27 A.L.J. 226 (Pt I), 227.
32 S. Y. Tan, “Execution Against Co-Owned Property” [2000] S.J.L.S. 52, 57.
33Emphasis added.
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seems to suggest that the interest of the judgment debtor crystalises upon
registration, which in turn means that the joint tenancy has been severed at that
point.34 If this were right, then the death of a joint tenant thereafter would have no
impact on the outcome whatsoever.
The objection to this approach is that it ignores the conventional criterion for
identifying a court order that results in a severance. The broadly accepted view is
that a court order has this effect only if it “requires the property to be dealt with
in a manner that expressly or by necessary implication is inconsistent with
continuance of the joint tenancy”.35 For example, in a divorce proceeding, the court
might order the land to be sold and for the sale proceeds to be distributed equally
between the joint tenants. In such a case, the court order is intended to be final and
unaffected by the chance of survivorship.36 To avoid frustrating the court order,
equity characteristically regards as done that which ought to be done, such that
the joint tenancy is immediately severed even before the court order is duly carried
though to performance.37 Another example is where a joint tenant has been
adjudicated bankrupt. A bankruptcy order operates by effecting an involuntary
alienation of the joint tenant’s aliquot share to the trustee in bankruptcy, which
would result in a severance. As the order is meant to be final, severance is deemed
to have occurred when the bankruptcy order was issued. AWSS is distinguishable
from the given examples as it merely empowers, rather than mandate, the Sheriff
to sell. The Sheriff is required to sell only if the judgment debt remains unsatisfied.
If the judgment debtor decides to pay up, the WSS loses its purpose. To leave the
door open for such an eventuality, the order is not final until the point of sale.
If severance were to be found, what would be the position if the WSS is
subsequently withdrawn? Do the co-owners continue to hold as tenants in common
or do they revert to being joint tenants? To reconvert a tenancy into common to a
joint tenancy is not without conceptual difficulties.38 But to leave it as it is would
undermine the co-owners’ preferredmanner of co-ownership. InMalayan Banking,
the learned judge preferred to avoid this potential mess by refraining from finding
a severance.39However, a possible solution, as the subsequent cases were prepared
to adopt,40 is the idea of temporary severance (or suspension of the joint tenancy),
which has been employed in the context of a lease granted by one joint tenant.41
In other words, if the registration of the WSS is subsequently withdrawn, the
tenancy in common reverts to a joint tenancy.What remains unclear is what happens
if one joint tenant dies after the registration of the writ but before the abandoned
sale.
34 For an alternative interpretation of the Land Titles Act s.135, see Severance at the point of sale below.
35B. Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law, 7th edn (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2017), p.282.
36 Sivakolunthu Kumarasamy v Shanmugam Nagaiah [1987] S.G.C.A. 21; [1987] S.L.R.(R.) 702 at 38–41. See
also Toh Ah Poh v Tao Li [2020] S.G.C.A. 18; [2020] 1 S.L.R. 837.
37K. Gray and S. F. Gray, Elements of Land Law, 5th edn (Oxford: OUP, 2008), pp.957–958.
38On the finality of severance, see B. Edgeworth, Butt’s Land Law, 7th edn (Sydney: Lawbook Co, 2017), p.268.
39Malayan Banking Bhd v Focal Finance Ltd [1998] S.G.H.C. 402; [1998] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 1008 at 18; Chan Lung
Kien v Chan Shwe Ching [2017] S.G.H.C. 136; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 208 at [29].
40Peter Low LLC v Higgins, Danial Patrick [2018] S.G.H.C. 59; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 1003 at [99], [103]–[105]; Chain
Land Elevator Corp v FB Industries Pte Ltd [2020] S.G.H.C. 2; [2020] 5 S.L.R. 1336 at [78]–[79].
41Wright v Gibbons [1949] H.C.A. 3; (1949) 78 C.L.R. 313 at 130.
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Severance at the point of sale
The remaining possibility is that severance occurs at the point of sale. In Chan
Shwe Ching v Leong Lai Yee, Leow JC observed that “when a sheriff decides to
sell the land under a WSS severance of a joint tenancy will occur”.42 The implied
assumption is that the judgment debtor’s interest can be determined at the point
of sale.43 However, this begs the question of what precisely can be sold, which
brings us back to the interpretation of the Land Titles Act s.135(1).
In the drafter’s commentary on this provision, he cited the case of
Registrar-General v Wood44 for the proposition that “the interest of a joint tenant
can be taken under writ”.45 In that case, the co-owners, who were husband and
wife, registered themselves as tenants by entireties, which conferred on neither a
power of severance.46 Subsequently a writ of fieri facias was issued against the
wife and the question arose as to whether she had any interest that can be taken in
execution. The majority in the High Court of Australia held that, following the
passing of the Married Women’s Property Act 1901, the wife could alienate her
interest as if she was not married, as in the case of a joint tenancy. Therefore the
Sheriff was obliged to sell the wife’s interest pursuant to the writ. It is important
to observe that although the bench was divided on whether the tenancy by entireties
survived the 1901 legislation, the common assumption was that the writ was
effective only if severance was possible. However, as neither co-owner had died,
the timing of severance was not tested. Severance could have occurred either at
the time the writ was issued or at the point of sale.
Thus, despite the reference to the time of registration in s.135(1), it hasn’t been
all that obvious that its drafter had given any thought to the timing of severance.
He could have, but did not, cite Dixon J in Wright v Gibbons who took a clear
stance on this matter. In fact, from his commentary, the reference was aimed at
emphasising the conclusiveness of the land titles register with the specific goal of
avoiding a priority dispute arising from pre-existing interests which do not appear
on the land titles register when the WSS is registered.47 Thus, subs.(2) clarifies
that “[f]or the purpose of determining the interest in land which belongs to a
judgment creditor”, the Sheriff is entitled to execute a transfer free of two types
of interests: first, any interest created after the registration of the WSS; and
secondly, any interest created prior to the registration of the WSS but not notified
on the land titles register at least three clear days before the Sheriff sale. One should
also note that the reference to a joint tenant as having a separate interest does not
necessarily contradict the continued existence of a joint tenancy. As explained
earlier, this is a loose reference that is not uncommonly seen in some of the older
cases.48 In short, s.135(1) does not say anything about the timing of severance.
If this much is accepted, we may proceed to answer the million-dollar question
of why severance occurs at the point of sale. The general rule is that only a
42Chan Shwe Ching v Leong Lai Yee [2015] S.G.H.C. 210; [2015] 5 S.L.R. 295 at [20].
43Chan Shwe Ching v Leong Lai Yee [2015] S.G.H.C. 210; [2015] 5 S.L.R. 295 at [20].
44Registrar-General v Wood [1926] H.C.A. 43; (1926) 38 C.L.R. 46.
45 J. Baalman, The Singapore Torrens system: being a commentary on the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 of the State
of Singapore (Singapore: Government Printer, 1961), p.218.
46The tenancy by entireties regarded the husband and wife as a compound person.
47 J. Baalman, The Singapore Torrens system: being a commentary on the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 of the State
of Singapore (Singapore: Government Printer, 1961), p.218.
48 In fact, such loose reference can be found in Registrar-General v Wood [1926] H.C.A. 43; (1926) 38 C.L.R. 46.
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49Land Titles Act s.63(1).
50Land Titles Act s.132(4).
51United Overseas Bank Ltd v Chia Kin Tuck [2006] S.G.H.C. 87; [2006] 3 S.L.R.(R.) 322 at [14]; Peter Low LLC
v Higgins, Danial Patrick [2018] S.G.H.C. 59; [2018] 4 S.L.R. 1003 at [71]. See also J. Baalman, The Singapore
Torrens system: being a commentary on the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 of the State of Singapore (Singapore:
Government Printer, 1961), p.211.
52The only significance of the mortgage being an interest in land is that it gives the mortgagee a priority in the
event of the mortgagor’s insolvency. cf. Singapore Air Charter Pte Ltd v Peter Low & Choo LLC [2020] S.G.C.A.
99; [2020] 2 S.L.R. 1399 at [59].
53Land Titles Act s.68(3). The same describes an equitable mortgage created by agreement accompanied by the
deposit of a document of title.
54 J. Baalman, The Singapore Torrens system: being a commentary on the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 of the State
of Singapore (Singapore: Government Printer, 1961), p.130. See also Lyons v Lyons [1967] V.R. 169; Re Shannon’s
Transfer [1967] Tas. S.R. 245. The position under English law is different: First National Securities Ltd v Hegerty
[1985] Q.B. 850; [1984] 3 W.L.R. 769.
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registered proprietor is competent to execute a registered transfer.49 However, it 
would be unrealistic to expect the judgment debtor, an unsuccessful litigant, to 
execute the necessary transfer so that his or her adversary could realise the fruits 
of the judgment. In recognition of this practical difficulty, the Sheriff is statutorily 
empowered to execute a registered transfer in favour of a purchaser under a Sheriff 
sale.50 It is important to recognise that this transfer is executed on behalf of the 
judgment debtor.51 This is consistent with the point that the Sheriff does not actually 
seize any interest in the land for the purposes of sale. Instead, the Sheriff is merely 
allowed to act in the very same manner the judgment debtor is entitled to. As 
explained earlier, it is settled law that a joint tenant has the power to alienate an 
aliquot share, which simultaneously results in severance of the joint tenancy. A 
Sheriff sale has the very same effect. The advantage of this explanation is that it 
locates the issue squarely within the recognised category of severance by alienation. 
It does not rely on any new fiction in addition to the existing one.
If indeed severance occurs only at the point of the Sheriff sale, then certain 
events that happen between the registration of the WSS and the time of sale could 
vary the extent of the interest belonging to the judgment debtor. There are three 
possible situations, using examples involving three joint tenants—A, B and C—with 
A being the judgment debtor. First, if A predeceases B and C, A’s interest will be 
extinguished. The WSS loses its subject matter. Secondly, if B (or C) dies, A’s 
interest is correspondingly enlarged. The Sheriff may sell a half share instead of 
a one third share. Thirdly, if A is the sole surviving joint tenant, the subject matter 
of the WSS is further enlarged and the Sheriff may sell the entire estate.
This inherent uncertainty has not been addressed in the cases dealing with the 
WSS most likely because it is incredibly rare for the judgment debtor to die during 
the short span of time between the registration of the WSS and the planned Sheriff 
sale. Nonetheless, the possibility remains. Interestingly, the same issue has 
generated some amount of debate in the context of a mortgage granted by one joint 
tenant. Although a mortgage is a security interest in land whereas a WSS is not, 
the two instruments are sufficiently similar in many other respects such that a 
meaningful comparison can be made.52 Because a Torrens mortgage operates as a 
security only and does not entail any conveyance of title,53 the granting of the 
mortgage does not sever the joint tenancy.54 When a mortgagee invokes a 
statutory power of sale, he or she executes a transfer on behalf of the mortgagor, 
in the same way as how a Sheriff sale works. What the mortgagee is entitled to 
sell will be affected
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by any operation of the rule of survivorship. If the joint tenancy remains intact, it 
will be severed at the point of sale.55
A number of scholars have advocated for the avoidance of the survivorship 
wheel of fortune by finding a severance upon the granting of the mortgage.56 To 
sidestep the fact that no alienation occurs before sale, the argument for severance 
has generally shifted the focus to an intention to sever. As Professor Nield argues, 
“[i]t is perhaps time to recognise that the source of severance should lie with the 
intention of the parties” and that intention can be “presumed or implied, either 
from the nature of a particular transaction or the course of the joint tenants’ 
conduct”.57 Without commenting on the merits of this proposal in respect of 
mortgages, it is at least clear that it is unworkable insofar as a WSS is concerned. 
Unlike a mortgage, which is intentionally granted, a WSS is forcibly imposed on 
the judgment debtor. It would be most unrealistic to expect to find, on the part of 
the judgment debtor as a losing party, any manifestation of intention to sever in 
favour of the judgment creditor.
This leaves us with an argument from fairness. As Lord Chancellor Cowper 
said in York v Stone, “a joint tenancy is an odious thing in equity”.58 However, any 
reliance on such a statement is bound to run into serious counter arguments. In the 
first place, equity’s abhorrence of the joint tenancy is balanced by the common 
law’s preference for a joint tenancy. This has been reinforced by a statutory 
presumption that if the instrument of transfer does not specify that the co-owners 
will hold as tenants in common, they will hold as joint tenants.59 Even within the 
realm of equity, there have been increasingly judicial statements to the effect that 
equity follows the law, especially when the joint tenants are married60 or in a de 
facto relationship.61 This reflects the acceptance that there is nothing inherently 
unfair about the rule of survivorship. Each joint tenant has an equal chance of 
gaining or losing from the operation of the rule.62 Similarly, while a judgment 
creditor might recover nothing, he or she would also benefit from any enlargement 
of the judgment debtor’s interest.
Having said this, an important point of distinction is that, unlike the judgment 
debtor, the judgment creditor did not choose to be subjected to the rule of 
survivorship. The judgment debtor may withdraw from the gamble by unilaterally 
severing the joint tenancy whereas the judgment creditor does not have this option. 
Perhaps the simple response is that litigation is far from being a risk-free endeavour 
and there are certain kinds of risk that litigants can be expected to bear. Indeed, 
the interest of the judgment creditor has to be weighed against the interest of the 
other joint tenant(s), who is equally innocent. To find severance when none of the
55 J. Baalman, The Singapore Torrens system: being a commentary on the Land Titles Ordinance 1956 of the State 
of Singapore (Singapore: Government Printer, 1961), p.130.
56 S. Nield, “To sever or not to sever: the effect of a mortgage by one joint tenant” [2001] Conv. 462, 473; D. M. 
Costa, “Co-ownership under Victorian Land Law: Part III” (1961) 3 M.U.L.R. 433, 448–454; T. Wells, “Mortgage 
by a joint Tenant—Torrens System” (936) 9 A.L.J. 22; R. F. Baird, “Mortgage by a Joint Tenant—Torrens System” 
(1936) 9 A.L.J. 431.57 S. Nield, “To sever or not to sever: the effect of a mortgage by one joint tenant” [2001] Conv. 462, 474.
58 York v Stone (1709) 91 E.R. 146; (1709) 1 Salk 158.
59Land Titles Act s.53(1).
60Lau Siew Kim v Yeo Guan Chye Terence [2007] S.G.C.A. 54; [2008] 2 S.L.R.(R.) 108 at [97]–[107]; Chan Yuen
Lan v See Fong Mun [2014] S.G.C.A. 36; [2014] 3 S.L.R. 1048 at [160]; Pereira Dennis John Sunny v Faridah bte
V Abdul Latiff [2017] S.G.H.C. 167; [2017] 5 S.L.R. 529 at [59].
61 Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17; [2007] 2 A.C. 432 at [56].
62Cray v Willis 24 E.R. 847; (1729) 2 P. Wins. 529.
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joint tenants have attempted to disrupt the four unities would undermine their
conscious choice to hold as joint tenants. On a balance, therefore, it is argued that
the status quo ought to be preserved.
Conclusion
The study of co-ownership law has largely been about identifying the form of
co-ownership in any given case and the ensuing implications. Unsurprisingly, the
doctrine of severance, which operates at the boundary, has always been a flashpoint.
As its focus is on the conversion of a joint tenancy into a tenancy in common, the
doctrine impliedly recognises the fundamental distinction between these two forms
of co-ownership. The suggestion that a joint tenant has a separate and distinct share
that can be taken in execution, which conflates actual and inchoate interests,
undermines the fundamental distinction altogether. The alternative explanation
offered in this article, which focuses on the vicarious nature of a Sheriff sale,
identifies the issue as one of severance by alienation, thus placing it squarely within
established principles of co-ownership law. If any broad lesson is to be derived
from the current debate, it would be that, in any attempt to find a solution to a
specific problem, the larger picture needs to be taken into account to avoid
unintentionally throwing the baby out with the bathwater.
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